I. Introduction
If one observes the awards given by investment treaty tribunals in the last few years, one will hardly find any example where the concept of 'legitimate expectations' has not been invoked by the claimant and, at least to a certain extent, endorsed by the arbitral tribunal. To transpose into the investment arbitration context the observation made by Lord Scott on the growing importance of the doctrine of legitimate expectations in English law, legitimate expectations are nowadays 'much in vogue ' . 1 Yet, despite the fortune that legitimate expectations seem to have been enjoying lately, there has been very little attempt by arbitral tribunals to provide a systematic and rigorous framework for the consideration of such expectations in investment treaty arbitration. Arbitral tribunals usually shy away from enquiring into the origins and the legal basis that justify the application of such concept and have typically taken for granted the idea that a breach of the investor's expectations may be relevant in deciding upon a violation of an investment treaty (especially of the fair and equitable treatment standard).
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to investigate the roots of the notion of legitimate expectations, and to examine to what extent the use of this concept is justified and appropriate within the investment treaty context. The paper starts by setting out certain methodological remarks which appear necessary to proceed with the exploration of the topic (Part II). As will be seen, the lack of a rigorous analysis by arbitral tribunal supporting the use of legitimate expectations characterizes the majority of investment treaty awards. With the possible exception of certain recent decisions (particularly in three Argentine casesContinental, Total, and El Paso), which have attempted to provide a more thorough methodological contribution to the debate in this area, invocation of legitimate expectations has largely been founded on precedent, that is, awards citing to previous awards that have referred to the concept. This approach, without further elaboration, proves however unsatisfactory. This paper considers whether the notion of legitimate expectations may be rooted in principles of domestic administrative law that are common to a number of different legal systems, and whether, as a result of such commonalities, resort to general principles of law may offer a useful framework for the analysis in this area. To this end, Part III of the paper provides an overview of the domestic law systems that afford some form of protection to the individual's legitimate expectations arising out of the decisionmaker's conduct. Part IV then turns to the investment treaty context, where recognition of legitimate expectations has generally been broader than in domestic legal systems. The paper will focus on protection of legitimate expectations under the fair and equitable treatment standard, in the context of which case law is by now quite rich. This paper seeks to contribute to the study of the topic by way of attempting to distil a system from the abundant and disordered jurisprudence on the issue. It will identify patterns of governmental conduct which tribunals have found to be susceptible of generating legitimate expectations deemed worthy of protection. In this regard, case law addresses mainly three types of different situations. In a first type of scenario, the state takes certain contractual commitments with the individual investor, which allegedly give rise to certain legitimate expectations (IV.2.A). In a second type of situation, characterized by a lower level of formality, we are merely in presence of what we could term 'unilateral declarations' by the host state (promises, assurances, representations, etc.). Do these types of acts also generate legitimate expectations which should be protected? And, if yes, what is the degree of specificity required to hold the state to its promises? (IV.2.B) Finally, in what is probably the most controversial scenario, a legitimate expectation of the investor is allegedly found to arise based on the existence of the regulatory framework per se, at the time the investor performs its investment in the host state. Here, to a greater extent than with regard to the other types of situations, the issue is closely linked to the concept of change -i.e., to what extent is the investor protected from a change in regulatory framework which affects its expectations? Or to what extent may it legitimately expect that the situation will remain unchanged? The issue is also related do the concept of risk -in what circumstances should a change in the regulatory framework (or the presence of an unstable framework) be considered part of the business risk that the investor has to bear when it chooses to invest in a particular country? (IV.2.C) Further, the role of the investor's conduct is also essential in certainty of the rule of law'. 6 As Stephan Schill has remarked, 'arbitral jurisprudence, including on fair and equitable treatment, is a source of expectations investors and states develop regarding the future application of the standard principles of international investment law, even if arbitral precedent is not formally binding.' 7 Thus, consistency in case law would seem to strengthen 'expectations' (of a different kind from those that form the subject of this paper) in the principal users of investment arbitration (states and investors) towards the certainty of the rule of law. The significance of arbitral precedent as understood in investment treaty arbitration has become undeniable and is a fascinating issue of ongoing debate. 8 Yet, it is not the topic of this paper. The point that is relevant to underscore for the limited purpose of this paper is that through a mechanical and not thoroughly thought-through reference to previous awards, tribunals evade their duty to explain the roots, the exact contours and possible limits of the issue of protection of the investor's legitimate expectations under the applicable investment treaty. 9 Resort to 'precedent' should be no substitute for analysisespecially if such analysis is not to be found in the early awards on which subsequent tribunals rely. 10 One may, for example, look at the Tecmed case, in which the tribunal was one of the first to refer, within its discussion of the fair and equitable treatment standard, to protection of legitimate expectations. In a dictum that was referred to by several subsequent tribunals with approval 11 (but which has not escaped 12 the tribunal in that case tied fair and equitable treatment to 'the good faith principle established by international law' and thus concluded that fair and equitable treatment required 'the Contracting Parties to provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the investment.' 13 Yet, the tribunal cited no authority which would support the inclusion of protection of 'basic expectations' in the fair and equitable treatment standard. The tribunal's reference to good faith can hardly serve that purpose. Despite being 'one of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations', good faith may not provide a source of obligation in itself, 14 and more importantly does not suffice to explain why a treaty standard such as fair and equitable treatment should be read as encompassing the particular sub-element of the duty to protect legitimate expectations, at least not without further elaboration.
It is submitted that a more fruitful way to understand the provenance of legitimate expectations in the sense that is recurrent in investment treaty arbitration could rather be found in certain principles of domestic administrative law that are common to a number of legal systems. A claimant investor may effectively look at such domestic systems with a view to invoking a general principle of law within the meaning of Art. 38(1)(c) of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute. 15 The relevance of general principles in investment treaty arbitration may be twofold.
First, general principles may be part of the applicable law. In an ICSID arbitration, for example, Art. 42 of the ICSID Convention dealing with the applicable law, refers to 'such rules of international law as may be applicable', which is to be read as including principles of law.
16 Also in those instances where an applicable law clause is included in a BIT, the treaty usually adopts a formulation referring to 'international law' (typically in combination with domestic law), which is clearly inclusive of general principles of law. Second, general principles may inform (and have in fact informed) the interpretation or application of the fair and equitable treatment, which can be seen as 'the perfect laboratory' for the operation of such principles. 18 The idea that investment law may benefit from an approach based on comparative public law has found support in scholarly work, 19 and in certain recent awards. 20 Also a number of investment treaties or treaty models now expressly recognise that domestic law concepts having the status of general principles inform the content of investment protection standards, in particular the vaguely worded fair and equitable treatment standard.
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With specific regard to legitimate expectations, Thomas Wälde's Separate Opinion in the Thunderbird v. Mexico case laid the groundwork for such a comparative public law inquiry. 22 Ideally carrying forward this type of examination, the arbitral tribunal in Total v. Argentina more recently found that 'a comparative analysis of the protection of legitimate expectations in domestic jurisdictions is justified'. 23 The arbitral tribunal, however, appeared rightly mindful to stress that the principle of legitimate expectations has found recognition 'both in civil law and in common law jurisdictions within well defined 18 24 Resort to comparativism may thus be indeed a valuable approach, provided, however, the relevant legal concepts (such as legitimate expectations) are imported with a clear understanding of their exact contours in the domestic systems of origin. With this comparative public law approach in mind, the paper now turns to examining protection of legitimate expectations under domestic legal systems.
III. Protection of legitimate expectations in domestic legal systems: A general principle of law?
As several studies devoted to this topic have highlighted, a number of domestic legal systems protect legitimate expectations, 25 intended as 'the entitlement of an individual to legal protection from harm caused by a public authority resiling from a previous publicly stated position, whether that be in the form of a formal decision or in the form of a representation'.
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The reasons for protecting legitimate expectations are usually found to lie in a series of considerations. On the one hand, the disappointment by the decisionmaker of an expectation may cause considerable harm to an individual who has relied upon its fulfilment (the reliance theory). 27 On the other hand, expectations are a central aspect of legal certainty and therefore of individual autonomy (the rule of law theory). 28 Under this second aspect, legal certainty and the individuals' capability to foresee the consequences of their actions are a prerequisite for rational enterprise in a capitalist economy.
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In German law, protection of legitimate expectations is linked to the fundamental principle of Vertrauensschutz (protection of trust), and its scope is particularly wide-reaching. 30 The German position has likely influenced the 24 Id. (emphasis added). 25 31 where it is considered a general principle of EU law. 32 In the EU context, the doctrine has particular prominence in the context of retroactive application of laws. 33 Besides that, when representations of the Community institutions are at stake, a legitimate expectation may also arise, if it is the result of precise and specific assurances given by the administration. 34 In contrast, with regard to claims of stability of the regulatory system, protection of legitimate expectations does not allow a company to claim 'a vested right to the maintenance of an advantage which it obtained from the establishment of the common organization of the market and which it enjoyed at a given time'. 35 The case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is settled to the effect that 'traders cannot have a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by the Community institutions in the exercise of their discretionary power will be maintained'.
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Despite the clear recognition of the doctrine as a general principle of EU law, the situation is not completely uniform in the domestic legal systems of the European member states. In France, the principle has not gained acceptance as part of French administrative law (except in situations which fall within the scope 31 
of EU law)
. 37 Yet, it is argued that similar protection is nonetheless achieved by way of other principles, such as the right to be heard, the protection of vested rights, and legal certainty. 38 In England, discussions on legitimate expectations have been engaging scholars and courts for many years. 39 Traditionally, English law provided only procedural protection of expectations. To say that protection granted to those who have seen their expectations defeated by an administrative decision is procedural means that the decision is set aside in order to give an opportunity to the individual to state its case, by allowing a hearing or adequate notice. 40 When the protection is substantive, the decision is definitely set aside (and thus the individual achieves what was expected as a matter of substance) or, in other cases, it is maintained but compensatory damages are awarded. 41 It is clear that only the second type of protection (in particular compensatory remedy for breach of substantive expectations) would be of interest for the purpose of an investment treaty claim.
To illustrate the distinction with an example, let us assume that an investor operating in the tobacco business, encouraged by a governmental grant, decides to build an oral snuff factory. Some years later, the government proceeds to ban oral snuff entirely. To protect the company's legitimate expectations as a matter of substance would imply quashing the ban or awarding compensation for the damages suffered. Where the court considers that a lawful promise or practice has induced a legitimate expectation of a benefit which is substantive, not simply procedural, authority now establishes that here too the court will in a proper case decide whether to frustrate the expectation is so unfair that to take a new and different course will amount to an abuse of power. Here, once the legitimacy of the expectation is established, the court will have the task of weighing the requirements of fairness against any overriding interest relied upon for the change of policy. 46 Although it remains a highly contentious matter, substantive protection of legitimate expectations can now be said to be established also in English law. 47 However, judges have held that its operation remains confined to 'exceptional situations'. 48 The reason for this is that courts are generally cautious in assuming a role through their judicial review which belongs to the administrative decisionmaker. Doctrines such as not-fettering, separation of powers and deference towards the administration's balancing of individual and public interests have the consequence of limiting the courts' power to find in favour of parties demanding substantive protection of expectations. Thus, courts will intervene only if there is a very serious imbalance between a person's reasonable expectation and the wider public interest in a decision which will disappoint it. 49 The balancing exercise is subject to a 'low intensity review' which applies generally to discretionary 44 Id., 371 per Taylor L.J ('It may well be that, in the end, the decision reached by the Secretary of State may prove to be wise and in the public interest, but such a draconian step should not be taken unless procedural propriety has been observed and those most concerned have been treated fairly'). 45 would impose an obvious and unacceptable fetter upon the power, and duty, of a responsible public authority to change its policy when it considered that that was required in fulfilment of its public responsibilities. In my judgment the law of legitimate expectation, where it is invoked in situations other than one where the expectation relied on is distinctly one of consultation, only goes so far as to say that there may arise conditions in which, if policy is to be changed, a specific person or class of persons affected must first be notified and given the right to be heard'). 46 50 Further, in those cases where representations by the administration were at issue, courts have been careful to limit protection of expectations to situations where those promises or assurances were 'clear, unambiguous, and devoid of relevant qualification'. 51 Moreover, English courts are still particularly reluctant to intervene when expectations are frustrated by general changes of policy (rather than by departure from an individualised assurance).
52 When a change of general policy is at issue, there has been almost a total denial of judicial protection. 53 In Hargreaves, the high hurdle was set that a legitimate expectation, created by previous policy, could be invoked only if it could be shown that the new policy was irrational, perverse or unreasonable. 54 The English acceptance of protection of substantive expectations has not been, at least for the time being, followed by other Commonwealth jurisdictions. Both Canada 55 and Australia 56 have been so far reluctant to extend judicial protection in cases of frustration of substantive expectations, and have generally taken the view that expectations about the exercise of administrative powers may only give rise to procedural rights.
In Latin American countries, recognition of the principle appears to be at its infancy, and its scope is to date fairly limited. 57 Yet, it is not unknown. It is significant that the ICSID tribunal in Total v. Argentina Could one, in light of this comparative overview, say that substantive protection of legitimate expectations has achieved global recognition in domestic law systems? While universality of identical rules is not required to establish a general principle of law, a careful examination of at least the most representative legal systems is called for. 59 And as Schreuer reminds, 'great care must be taken to establish [general principles of law] by inductive proof and not simply to assume or postulate their existence'. 60 The comparative analysis carried out shows that it may be difficult to provide a clear-cut answer to the question. It is certainly true that the growing substantive protection of expectations in jurisdictions (such as England), which have traditionally been hostile to it, is a significant development. Moreover, the principle is well-established in a number of other administrative systems (in the civil law, German and Dutch, for example), and has enjoyed clear, consistent, and relatively broad acceptance within a supra-national context, such as the EU. On the other hand, there are also examples of jurisdictions which are reluctant to embrace the concept, although it could, at least in some cases, be argued that equal protection is nonetheless achieved by way of other legal concepts. Despite these uncertainties, one could nonetheless conclude that to establish an at least emerging general principle of protection of legitimate expectations would not seem to be an unrealistic endeavour. 61 It is thus this general principle that will inform the content of fair and equitable treatment in investment treaty law. However, the above analysis has also shown that even where the doctrine is accepted on the domestic level, it is accompanied by clear limitations, which must be kept in mind when attempting to invoke the principle within the investment treaty arbitration context. In particular, most domestic systems tend to distinguish protection of expectations in situations of individualised representations which the administration repudiates, from cases where the individual is affected by a general change of policy. It is the first case that is treated as the strongest, whereas protection in the second instance would be quite exceptional, and would attract extremely restrained judicial review. For, as Craig explains, 'an unequivocal representation made to a person […] carries a particular moral force' and 'holding the public body to such a representation is less likely to have serious consequences for the administration as a whole.'
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With that background in mind, it is to investment treaty law that the article now turns. It will be seen that in the investment framework, invoking protection 58 […] a significant growth in the role and scope of the legitimate expectation principle, from an earlier function as a subsidiary interpretative principle to reinforce a particular interpretative approach chosen, to its current role as a self-standing subcategory and independent basis for a claim under the "fair and equitable standard" as under Art. 1105 of the NAFTA. This is possibly related to the fact that it provides a more supple way of providing a remedy appropriate to the particular situation as compared to the more drastic determination and remedy inherent in concept of regulatory expropriation. It is probably partly for these reasons that "legitimate expectation" has become for tribunals a preferred way of providing protection to claimants in situations where the tests for a "regulatory taking" appear too difficult, complex and too easily assailable for reliance on a measure of subjective judgment. 65 The first arbitral tribunal to clearly spell out that fair and equitable treatment encompasses protection of expectations was the tribunal in that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the investment'.
66
The tribunal went on to say that:
The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations.
[…] The foreign investor also expects the host State to act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions or permits issued by the State that were relied upon by the investor to assume its commitments as well as to plan and launch its commercial and business activities.
67
This paragraph of the Tecmed award has been said to provide 'the most farreaching exposition of the principle underlying the developing notion of legitimate expectations as applied to fair and equitable treatment in investment law', 68 and has encountered criticism. A few years after Tecmed, the award in Thunderbird v. Mexico provided a definition of the concept of legitimate expectation, which has also enjoyed fortune amongst subsequent tribunals. Citing to the principle of good faith and to 'recent investment case law', the tribunal observed that: the concept of "legitimate expectations" relates, within the context of the NAFTA framework, to a situation where a Contracting Party's conduct creates reasonable and justifiable expectations on the part of an investor (or investment) to act in reliance on said conduct, such that a failure by the NAFTA Party to honour those expectations could cause the investor (or investment) to suffer damages. 71 Under subsequent jurisprudence, protection of legitimate expectations rapidly became to be considered as the 'dominant element' 72 or as 'one of the major components'
73 of the fair and equitable treatment standard. 74 There is in fact no single tribunal on record that has steadfastly refused to find that -at least in principle -such standard encompasses legitimate expectations. Yet, arbitral tribunals have gradually posed limits and qualifications to such recognition. The subsequent analysis will review the contours of the principle as is currently understood in the evolving jurisprudence. In particular, different types of state conduct have been found to arouse legitimate expectations. The following paragraphs attempt to categorize different patterns in relation to which a breach of legitimate expectations has been found by investment treaty tribunals. A distinction between these different types of situations is important because each of them arguably justifies different degrees of legal protection and requires distinct issues to be addressed. 
Distinct situations warranting distinct approaches

A. Contractual arrangements
77
To give one example of a successful invocation of legitimate expectations arising out of an investment contract one can look at the MTD v. Chile. 78 In that case, the investor was able to secure an investment contract with Chile's foreign investment agency concerning an urban development project. The investor contended that the investment contract, along with other factors, had given rise to the expectation that the project could be carried out successfully (even if the planning regulations would not allow it). The necessary permits were then denied by the Chilean authorities based on the laws in force. The tribunal found that the host state, by entering into the investment contract on the one hand, and by denying the relevant permits on the other, had frustrated the investor's legitimate expectations and had thus acted unfairly and inequitably.
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When considering expectations arising under contracts within the context of a fair and equitable treatment claim, a caveat is necessary: even if the investor has an expectation that the contract be fulfilled, a disappointment of such expectation cannot per se be equated to a violation of the fair and equitable treaty standard included in the treaty. To reason otherwise would mean that invocation of legitimate expectations would turn the fair and equitable treatment standard into a general umbrella clause, which can hardly be a tenable interpretation. . 76 It should be noted that contracts may also contain stabilization clauses, which provide an additional tool for the investor's position and may reinforce its expectations. The present section reviews the issues connected with possible expectations arising out of contracts containing no stabilization clauses whereas the specific consequences of such clauses on the investor's expectations are addressed in the context of the analysis of stability of the legal framework (see infra at IV. Case law on this point is rather consistent in distinguishing between legitimate expectations protected under the treaty and purely contractual expectations. In Parkerings v. Lithuania, the city of Vilnius had entered into a contract with the investor concerning the construction of a parking system in order to control the traffic in the city's historic old town. The tribunal made the following observation on the issue of contractual expectations:
It is evident that not every hope amounts to an expectation under international law. The expectation a party to an agreement may have of the regular fulfilment of the obligation by the other party is not necessarily an expectation protected by international law. In other words, contracts involve intrinsic expectations from each party that do not amount to expectations as understood in international law. Indeed, the party whose contractual expectations are frustrated should, under specific conditions, seek redress before a national tribunal. This line of cases suggests that frustration of contractual expectations is not, without something further, susceptible of protection under the fair and equitable standard. This proposition is in harmony with general international law on state responsibility whereby a breach of contract with an alien is not as such considered to be a breach of international law. 86 However, case law under investment treaties is not uniform in explaining what this additional element should be. It would seem that for a treaty violation to occur, one would require either 'a breach involving sovereign power' (puissance publique), 87 Thus, the concept of legitimate expectations in these kinds of situations can be accepted as a useful tool to measure the parties' assumptions when they entered into contractual arrangements, provided, however, the unfair or inequitable treatment by the host state is established by reference to additional factors (beyond the mere non-fulfilment of contract). It is clear that some of the formulations seen above lack the requisite rigor to clearly indicate what such additional element should be when one seeks to understand whether a contract breach qualifies as a treaty breach. This is an area which demands further refinement and where arbitral tribunals will have to provide more precise guidance in the future.
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A final point should be made concerning expectations arising out of contracts. It has been seen that contracts engender expectations which have to be placed at the highest stand of protection -contracts usually reflect the carefully negotiated balance achieved by the opposing parties and could be said to crystallize the parties' expectations. Thus, it will be natural to look at the carefully negotiated contractual terms first to infer what the parties could legitimately expect from the transaction, before turning to more external considerations (such as less formal unilateral representations or the general regulatory context). As noted by Prof. James Crawford, "[r]eference to a general and vague standard of legitimate expectations is no substitute for contractual rights. 
B. Informal representations
Claimants in investment treaty arbitrations have often invoked the concept of legitimate expectations when the host state allegedly made certain promises or representations, on which the investor relied at the time of making its investment and the disappointment of which caused the investor to suffer damages. Sometimes the cases may not be easily categorised, because the factual pattern may involve both a contract and some kind of informal representations, which is invoked usually to reinforce those contractual commitments. Alternatively, representations are invoked in addition to alleged guarantees to be found in the regulatory framework (on which see infra IV.2.C). Yet, in other cases we are in presence merely of unilateral representations. It is thus important to examine whether and to what extent a promise, assurance, or comfort letter is capable of arousing legitimate expectations, frustrations of which would entail a violation of fair and equitable treatment. Investment treaty tribunals have been willing to extend protection based on the theory of legitimate expectations in a number of cases.
As early as in SPP v. Egypt, where the jurisdiction of the ICSID arbitral tribunal did not arise under an investment treaty but under Egypt's domestic law, did the tribunal recognize that the investor was entitled to rely, as a matter of international law, on certain decisions by certain high-ranking Government officials:
82. It is possible that under Egyptian law certain acts of Egyptian officials including even Presidential Decree No. 475 may be considered legally nonexistent or null and void or susceptible to invalidation. However, these acts were cloaked with the mantle of Government authority and communicated as such to foreign investors who relied on them in making their investments. 83. Whether legal under Egyptian law or not, the acts in question were the acts of Egyptian authorities, including the highest executive authority of the Government. These acts, which are now alleged to have been in violation of the Egyptian municipal legal system, created expectations protected by established principles of international law.
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This case, according to Dolzer and Schreuer, would suggest that there is authority to the effect that 'the investor's legitimate expectations are protected even without a treaty guarantee of FET'. 94 Within the investment treaty context, jurisprudence on this issue is quite rich, and one can find several statements to the effect that an investor is able to rely on the host state's representations. 92 This teleological element (that is, representations must have had the purpose of inducing the investment) was also stressed by the tribunal in Glamis Gold v. USA:
a State may be tied to the objective expectations that it creates in order to induce investment. Such an upset of expectations thus requires something greater than mere disappointment; it requires, as a threshold condition, the active inducement of a quasi-contractual expectation. 97 The tribunal in the already cited Parkerings v. Lithuania case further observed that:
[An] expectation is legitimate if the investor received an explicit promise or guaranty from the host-State, or if implicitly, the host-State made assurances or representation that the investor took into account in making the investment. Finally, in the situation where the host-State made no assurance or representation, the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the agreement are decisive to determine if the expectation of the investor was legitimate. 98 The final part of the Parkerings passage flags the issue of whether an expectation may arise irrespective of the presence of a representation or assurance. The tribunal does not seem to rule out this possibility, depending on the surrounding circumstances. 99 Again, one must bear in mind that there was in this case a contract between the city and the investor. Thunderbird v. Mexico presents a clear case where the investor could neither invoke contractual commitments with the host state, nor any unilaterally granted administrative acts (permits or licenses). Thunderbird thus essentially relied on a legal opinion (the 'Oficio') given to it by the Mexican authorities concerning the legality of its proposed gaming operations. After the investment was made, the Mexican authorities shut down the relevant facilities because they were found to involve a considerable degree of chance, in violation of the gambling prohibition in the host state. The tribunal discussed the issue of legitimate expectations and found, by majority, that the Oficio could not generate a legitimate expectations upon which the investor could reasonably rely in operating its gaming machines in Mexico. 100 It proved fatal to the case the fact that the investor, in seeking such legal opinion, had not disclosed relevant information as to the nature of the gaming machines, thereby 'put[ting] the reader on the wrong track'.
101
In sum, arbitral practice thus confirms that representations by the host state are, in principle, capable of generating legitimate expectations, and may be protected under the fair and equitable treatment, if they are later repudiated by the state. This position is in line with what happens in the domestic administrative systems, which, as seen, treat those instances as particularly worthy of protection.
Specificity of the representation.
It is also clear from investment case law that not each and every representation or assurance is amenable to arouse legitimate expectations. It has been seen above that domestic legal systems as well as EU law require a certain grade of precision or lack of ambiguity for representations to be enforced under the theory of legitimate expectations. Investment treaty jurisprudence is likewise consistent in requiring a certain level of specificity. The requirement that a promise be specific may, in a first meaning, concern the object (i.e., the content) and the unambiguous form of the representation. In a different sense, specificity means individualisation, i.e., the promise or representation is addressed to the individual investor, and not to the generality. 102 Such latter distinction assumes particular importance when expectations are grounded in instruments of general application (such as legislation), and will be also addressed later when dealing with the issue of stability.
In Frontier Petroleum v. Czech Republic, the tribunal reviewed two letters sent by the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade to claimant, in which the Ministry indicated that 'the state would have the possibility to enter into negotiations' with the investor. 103 The tribunal found this not be an 'undertaking', entitled to protection under the Treaty need not be based on an explicit assurance from the Czech Government'); Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd et al. but merely a 'signal to Claimant that there was a possibility that the state could negotiate'. 104 The two letters 'did not provide an adequate basis for the Claimant to rely on some form of representation or expectation', and they did 'not exhibit the level of specificity necessary to generate legitimate expectations.' 105 In White Industries v. India, the claimant argued that Indian officials had made representations to one of the claimant's directors when he was travelling to India with a view to establishing his investment. Allegedly such representations were to the effect that 'it was safe for Claimant to invest in India and that the Indian legal system was, to all intents and purposes, the same as the Australian legal system.' 106 The Tribunal found that those representations did not meet the requisite level of specificity for the purpose of arousing legitimate expectations amenable to be protected under the fair and equitable treatment standard. 107 Metalclad v. Mexico concerned a dispute arising from the construction of a hazardous waste landfill. The investor had secured the necessary permits at both the federal and state level. It lacked a permit on the municipal level, but received repeated assurances by federal officials that such permit was not needed, and that the municipality would have no legal basis for denying the permit. After several failed attempts to reach a solution to the impasse, Metalclad filed a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim. The tribunal found that fair and equitable treatment had been breached because, inter alia, the municipality's denial of the permit was improper and Metalclad could rely upon the representations of the Federal Government. The tribunal held that:
Metalclad was entitled to rely on the representations of federal officials and to believe that it was entitled to continue its construction of the landfill. In following the advice of these officials, and filing the municipal permit application […], Metalclad was merely acting prudently and in the full expectation that the permit would be granted. 108 In Feldman v. Mexico, the tribunal contrasted the assurances at issue in the case with those given by the Mexican authorities in Metalclad (which the Feldman tribunal referred to as 'definitive, unambiguous and repeated'), 109 and found that those given to Feldman were 'at best ambiguous and largely informal'. 110 Also Wälde in his Separate Opinion in Thunderbird, though adopting a broad notion of protection of legitimate expectations, concedes that 'a legitimate expectation is assumed more readily if an individual investor receives specifically formal assurances that display visibly an official character'. 111 The threshold is thus 'quite high'.
Statements of a more general nature issued by politicians in varying contexts or general investment-encouraging policies directed towards investors have also been sometimes invoked as a basis of legitimate expectations. Arbitral tribunals have treated them differently. In BG v. Argentina, the fair and equitable treatment claim was mostly based on the breach of guarantees contained in the regulatory framework. However, the tribunal mentioned the message to Congress by Argentina's president when requesting the ratification of the relevant bilateral investment treaty, 113 and a so-called 'information memorandum' prepared by Argentina to promote the privatization of a state-owned gas company, 114 as additional elements on which the investor could rely when making its investment. 115 The concrete effect of these declarations or documents on legitimate expectations and on the breach of the fair and equitable treatment are however difficult to assess, given that what was decisive for the tribunal's finding was the breach of the 'guarantees' contained in the regulatory framework.
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The MTD v. Chile award mentions repeatedly the Chilean President's toast speech at a dinner with the President of Malaysia (the home state of the investor) praising the real estate project at issue, as well as his public statement sent to be read at the inauguration of the project. 117 The tribunal would seem to have taken those acts into account when evaluating the investor's expectations. 118 In PSEG v. Turkey, the host state's policy to encourage and welcome investment could not found a claim of legitimate expectations. After noting that '[l]egitimate expectations by definition require a promise of the administration on which the Claimants rely to assert a right that needs to be observed', 119 the tribunal held that the general investment encouragement policy pursued by Turkey 'did not entail a promise made specifically to the Claimants about the success of their proposed project'. 122 The tribunal refused to find that legitimate expectations had been frustrated by way of repudiation of such statements and held that in order to evaluate the relevance of [the "reasonable legitimate expectations" concept] applied within Fair and Equitable Treatment standard and whether a breach has occurred, relevant factors include: i) the specificity of the undertaking allegedly relied upon which is mostly absent here, considering moreover that political statements have the least legal value, regrettably but notoriously so.
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Also in El Paso, claimant relied on a general message to the Congress by the Argentine President jointly with Minister Cavallo about the 'legal certainty' that the enactment of the Electricity Law would achieve. 124 The tribunal observed that 'a declaration made by the President of the Republic clearly must be viewed by everyone as a political statement, and this Tribunal is aware, as is every individual, of the limited confidence that can be given to such political statements in all countries of the world'. 125 Although the Tribunal conceded that such statements may have induced investors to decide to invest in Argentina, they did not equate to a 'a specific commitment to foreign investors not to modify the existing framework, which was designed to attract them'.
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The claimant had also relied on the fact that 'in order to promote investments in the Electricity Sector and to explain the Regulatory Framework, the Government had organised road shows, conferences and seminars to explain the main features of the Framework and to give assurance to investors that their rights would be protected.' 127 In the Claimant's opinion such conduct should be equated to 'unilateral declarations' akin to those that were considered binding by the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests cases. The tribunal refused to follow the analogy, holding that 'no lesson can be drawn from the Nuclear Tests cases to give legal weight to investment-promoting road shows', and that 'such political and commercial incitements cannot be equated with commitments capable of creating reasonable expectations protected by the international mechanism of the BIT '. 128 This last passage from the El Paso award raises the question as to whether the rules on unilateral acts which have developed on the inter-state level may be applicable by analogy in an investor-state context. This could be a different way of conceptualizing the binding effect on states of their promises towards investors. Prof. Michael Reisman and Dr. Mahnoush Arsanjani have explored this question in a seminal article, and have concluded that:
Where a host State which seeks foreign investment acts intentionally, so as to create expectations in potential investors with respect to particular treatment or comportment, the host State should […] be bound by the 122 Id. 123 Id., para. 261 (internal footnote omitted). 124 Id., para. 393. 125 Id., para. 395. 126 It may in fact be argued that the binding nature of a unilateral act on an interstate level is at least partly connected with the expectation that such act creates in third states. This seems to have been expressly recognized by the ICJ in Nuclear Tests, in which the Court linked the binding character of unilateral declaration to the principle of good faith, mentioning also the protection of trust and confidence which third states may place on such declarations. 130 When the topic of unilateral acts was dealt with by the International Law Commission (ILC), the debate turned several times on the ultimate foundation for the binding nature of unilateral acts. Along with the opinion that such binding character rested on the intent or will of the state making the declaration, a different opinion precisely pointed to the expectation that the declaration creates in other states. 131 The final text of the Guiding Principles on unilateral declaration of states, approved in 2006 by the ILC, records, in its preamble, that 'in practice, it is often difficult to establish whether the legal effects stemming from the unilateral behaviour of a State are the consequence of the intent that it has expressed or depend on the expectations that its conduct has raised among other subjects of international law'.
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Thus, one finds support also in the public international law rules on unilateral acts for the contention that representations made by a state, from which it later resiles, engender expectations that are worthy of protection. These public international rules could be applied by analogy within the investor-state context. Certain investment tribunals have recently accepted this proposition, although in the context of the analysis of a different issue, i.e. the interpretation of consent to arbitration contained in a piece of domestic legislation. 133 The tribunals in those cases recalled ICJ case law on the interpretation of unilateral declarations, 134 and quoted the ILC Guiding Principles. 135 Outside of these examples on consent, arbitral tribunal have generally not invoked international law rules on unilateral acts when dealing with representations or promises of a substantive nature (such as the ones that more closely concern us here). As seen, they have rather preferred to follow the well-trodden path of legitimate expectations. The El Paso tribunal, in the above mentioned passage, refused the proposed analogy with the Nuclear Tests cases, yet not as a matter of legal principle, it would seem, but because it found the acts at issue to be factually very different. In any event, one must note that, even if one were to apply general international law rules on unilateral declarations, and in particular the ILC 2006 Guiding Principles on this issue, the state's declaration would entail obligations for the formulating state 'only if it is stated in clear and specific terms'. 136 Thus, as can be seen, the standard to hold a state to its representation would not in the end be different to the one that investment tribunals have articulated through the doctrine of legitimate expectations in the consistent line of cases analysed above.
C. General regulatory framework
In a third type of situation, investors claim that their expectations were grounded in the general legislative and regulatory framework as in force when they made their investment, which the host state later changed so as to frustrate such expectations, in breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard. The 137 The difference between the two situations seen above (where there is either a formal arrangement between the parties, or the host state has at least given an informal (but specific) representation) is clear, because in this third scenario 'investor's expectations are rooted in regulation of a normative and administrative nature that is not specifically addressed to the relevant investor'. 138 The starting point which is rather uncontroversial is that the investor must take the local law as it stands at the time of making the investment (which means the investor cannot subsequently complain about the application of that law to its investment). 139 It is at that moment in time that the expectations are assessed. 140 But to what extent is the investor legitimately entitled to expect that such law is not going to change after it has performed its investment? When analysing the domestic administrative law protection of legitimate expectations, it has been seen that domestic systems have been cautious to extend protection in these sets of circumstances. 141 When it looked at those domestic law systems to draw parallels with investment treaty law, the Total tribunal highlighted that 'only exceptionally has the concept of legitimate expectations been the basis of redress when legislative actions by a state was at stake'. 142 Yet, the argument that a claimant may be able to rely on expectations purely based on the regulatory framework has enjoyed a certain fortune in the investment treaty context. This approach has usually been justified on the grounds that the fair and equitable treatment standard would entail an element of stability of the regulatory framework. Thus, in a first line of cases, certain tribunals have been willing to extend protection under the fair and equitable treatment so as to cover the state's duty to maintain a stable framework. This sub-element of the standard has been often buttressed through a reference to the BIT's preamble, which may refer to stability as one of the goals of the treaty. 143 Thus, the tribunal in Occidental Exploration & Production Co. (OEPC) v. Ecuador, for example, referred to the preamble of the BIT to conclude that 'stability of the legal and business framework is […] an essential element of fair and equitable treatment' 144 and that 'there is certainly an obligation not to alter the legal and business environment in which the investment has been made'. 145 Most of the first generation Argentine cases have turned on the issue of stability of the regulatory framework. However, one has to note that in those cases the investors could also invoke licenses (granted by the government by decree), which, in addition to referring to the guarantees established by legislation, also stated that they could not be modified without the licensee's consent. Those licenses can be considered part of the regulatory framework, yet at the same time they are certainly more individualised than a piece of general legislation. It is thus difficult to evaluate exactly what role the presence of such licenses have played for the tribunals' finding of breach of the fair and equitable treatment, although certain far-reaching dicta would seem to suggest that expectations arising from the regulatory framework would alone have been sufficient for such a finding. In CMS v. Argentina, for example, the tribunal drew on the preamble of the applicable BIT to hold that 'stable legal and business environment is an essential element of fair and equitable treatment'. 146 By entirely altering and transforming the legal business environment under which the investment was decided and made, Argentina had violated the fair and equitable treatment standard. 147 The LG&E v. Argentina tribunal cited to the developing jurisprudence on the stability requirement as providing 'an emerging standard of fair and equitable treatment in 149 and thus violated the fair and equitable treatment standard. 150 In Enron v. Argentina, the tribunal held that a 'key element of fair and equitable treatment is the requirement of a "stable framework for the investment"', 151 along with the requirement to protect legitimate expectations. 152 The tribunal added that 'it was in reliance upon the conditions established by the Respondent in the regulatory framework for the gas sector that Enron embarked on its investment' and that 'Enron had reasonable grounds to rely on such conditions'. 153 By 'dismantling' the regulatory framework, Argentina had failed to provide a stable framework as required by the BIT, thereby acting unfairly and inequitably. 154 In contradistinction, certain tribunals have stressed that as a matter of principle the state's right to regulate cannot be considered frozen or restricted as a result of the existence of investment treaties.
In Saluka, one can find repeated statements to the effect that no investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is made remain totally unchanged. 155 And in Parkerings v. Lithuania, the tribunal required due diligence from the investor, who 'must anticipate that the circumstances could change, and thus structure its investment in order to adapt it to the potential changes of legal environment.' 156 The three tribunals in the Argentine cases of Continental, Total, and El Paso devoted long discussions to distance themselves from that line of case law recalled above, which combined expectations and stability of the regulatory framework. For example, in Continental, the tribunal made the forceful statement that:
it would be unconscionable for a country to promise not to change its legislation as time and needs change, or even more to tie its hands by such a kind of stipulation in case a crisis of any type or origin arose. Such an implication as to stability in the BIT's Preamble would be contrary to an effective interpretation of the Treaty; reliance on such an implication by a foreign investor would be misplaced and, indeed, unreasonable. The Total tribunal similarly recalled the 'powers' as well as the 'responsibility' which BIT signatories have 'to amend their legislation in order to adapt it to change and the emerging needs and requests of their people in the normal exercise of their prerogatives and duties'. 158 It added that '[t]his type of regulation [of a normative and administrative nature not specifically addressed to the relevant investor] is not shielded from subsequent changes under the applicable law'. 159 The combination instituted by the arbitral tribunals in the first line of cases (Occidental or the early Argentine disputes) between the alleged requirement of stability and the legitimate expectations which are said to arise from the regulatory framework per se, should indeed be scrutinised with great caution. Generally, if any expectations, in such situations, are to arise at all, those are to the effect that sooner or later regulation will change over time, because 'economic and legal life is by nature evolutionary'. 160 The crucial question becomes, indeed, the one of the right balance between the stability and legitimate expectations, on the one hand, and the host state's right to amend the regulatory framework, on the other. This seems to be at the current focal point of debates as to the content of fair and equitable treatment.
If one attempts to piece together what emerges from the latest awards which have examined this topic, one can see that there has been a gradual limitation of the more far-reaching dicta found in the first generation cases seen above. The resulting framework can perhaps be delineated in the following terms.
First, to imply, without qualifications, a requirement of stability within fair and equitable treatment would place obligations on host states which would be 'inappropriate and unrealistic'. 161 Preambular language which makes reference to a stable framework cannot suffice to establish such a burdensome obligation upon host states. For an investor to be legitimately able to claim damages as a result of the alteration of the general framework, additional guarantees are needed, such as an express contractual commitment (preferably in the form of stabilization clause) or a specific unilateral declaration attributable to the state that it would not proceed with changes.
Second, expectations as to the regulatory framework cannot be measured according to an abstract yardstick of good governance (which would be hard if not impossible to define), but must be assessed in concreto, with regard to all circumstances, including the specificities of the host state, its level of development, as well to the particular sector in which the investment is made.
These two different aspects will now be analysed in turn.
a. Expectations of a stable framework v. specific commitments
Arbitral tribunals taking a cautious approach as to the ability of instruments of general application (such as laws, regulations, etc.) to arouse legitimate expectations protected under the BIT have contrasted such situation with the scenario where the host state has assumed some form of specific commitment towards the investor. The idea behind this position is that if the state has renounced to exercise its regulatory power, this is such an extraordinary act that must emerge from an unequivocal commitment. 162 Such commitment can be for example in the form of a stabilization clause inserted in a state contract between the state and the investor. 163 Protection when a stabilization clause is present is higher because the investor has been able to bargain that commitment individually. 164 It would be thus illogical to extend such protection to investors who have not managed to bargain for such commitment (for whatever reason), by using the legitimate expectations doctrine. 165 In Parkerings v. Lithuania, the tribunal contrasted the investor's alleged right to invoke a stable framework with a situation in which the investor is able to rely on a stabilization clause. It made the following general remark:
It is each State's undeniable right and privilege to exercise its sovereign legislative power. A State has the right to enact, modify or cancel a law at its own discretion. Save for the existence of an agreement, in the form of a stabilisation clause or otherwise, there is nothing objectionable about the amendment brought to the regulatory framework existing at the time an investor made its investment. Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 28 April 2011, para. 302 ('foreign investors are acutely aware that significant modification of taxation levels represents a serious risk, especially when investing in a country at an early stage of economic and institutional development. In many instances, they will obtain the appropriate guarantees in that regard in the form of, for example, stability agreements which limit or prohibit the possibility of tax increases.
[…] In the absence of such a stability agreement in favor of GEM, Claimants have not succeeded in establishing that they had legitimate expectations that they would not be exposed to significant tax increases in the future'). 165 Also the tribunal in Total noted that the legal regime in force at the time of making the investment is not per se subject to a guarantee of stability, unless the state has explicitly assumed a legal obligation such as a stabilization clause. 169 The tribunal also contrasted the (unfounded) right to stability with the situation where the claimant was able to rely on a unilateral declaration by the host state (which the claimant was not, in the case at hand). 170 Thus, in agreement with Continental, also Total suggests that the general framework only engenders those 'reduced' expectations, which enjoy the weakest form of protection if compared to contractual commitments and specific promises. Reduced protection of statements or guarantees contained in legislation is justified because these 'promises' are not addressed to individual subjects (i.e., they lack the element of specificity with regard to the addressee). 171 The findings in EDF v. Romania
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and El Paso v. Argentina 173 are to a similar effect.
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The most difficult question is whether there can be instances where the change in regulatory framework is so severe or radical that, even in the absence of a stabilization clause or an individualised representation, a tribunal may nonetheless find a violation of the fair and equitable treatment by reference to a frustration of the investor's legitimate expectations. It is interesting to note that even tribunals which showed great caution on this issue, such as Total and El Paso, did not go as far as ruling out completely that possibility.
In El Paso the tribunal made the following statement:
There can be no legitimate expectation for anyone that the legal framework will remain unchanged in the face of an extremely severe economic crisis. No reasonable investor can have such an expectation unless very specific commitments have been made towards it or unless the alteration of the legal framework is total. 175 The tribunal did not further explain what it would take for an alteration of the framework to be 'total'. It possibly found a way out of this conundrum, by holding that the several measures at issue which altered the framework did not constitute a violation of the BIT, if taken in isolation, but did so, if their cumulative effect was combined. The tribunal observed that:
It cannot be denied that in the matter before this Tribunal the cumulative effect of the measures was a total alteration of the entire legal setup for foreign investments, and that all the different elements and guarantees just mentioned can be analysed as a special commitment of Argentina that such a total alteration would not take place. 176 It has been seen that Total also stands for the proposition that, in principle, absent a stabilization clause or a unilateral individualised representation, there can be no legitimate claim of frustration of expectations arising from the regulatory framework per se. Yet, the tribunal was not willing to consider this as an absolute rule subject to no exceptions. After stating that instruments of general regulation are not shielded from subsequent changes under the applicable law, the tribunal introduced an exception:
This notwithstanding, a claim to stability can be based on the inherently prospective nature of the regulation at issue aimed at providing a defined framework for future operations. This is the case for regimes, which are applicable to long-term investments and operations, and/or providing for "fall backs" or contingent rights in case the relevant framework would be changed in unforeseen circumstances or in case certain listed events materialize. 177 It held that according to the gas regime which Argentina had enacted, the state was empowered to fix the tariffs of a public utility, but it had to do so 'in such a way that the concessionaire [was] able to recover its operations costs, amortize its investments and make a reasonable return over time'. 178 The tribunal found that the failure to readjust the tariffs according to principles of 'economic equilibrium and business viability' entailed a violation of the fair and equitable treatment. 179 Similar considerations were then repeated with regard to the different claims relating to the electricity sector. 180 In perhaps even clearer terms, the arbitral tribunal found that
Expectations based on [principles of economic rationality, public interest, reasonableness and proportionality] are reasonable and hence legitimate, even in the absence of specific promises by the government. Hence, the fair and equitable standard has been breached through the setting of prices that do not remunerate the investment made nor allow reasonable profit to be gained contrary to the principles governing the activities of privately owned generators under Argentina's own legal system. 181 As already mentioned, the Parkerings tribunal held that, absent a specific promise by the host state, a claim of stability of the framework could not be justified. It concluded by saying that:
The record does not show that the State acted unfairly, unreasonably or inequitably in the exercise of its legislative power. The Claimant has failed to demonstrate that the modifications of laws were made specifically to prejudice its investment. 182 Thus, the tribunal seemed to suggest that it will be relevant to look at whether the legislative modifications at issue evinced a form of prejudicial intent against the investor (in which case one can assume the tribunal would have been ready to find a breach of the BIT).
In PSEG v. Turkey, the tribunal held that 'stability cannot exist in a situation where the law kept changing continuously and endlessly, as did its interpretation and implementation.' 183 Thus, unlike El Paso, where the focus was on the totality of the change, here the tribunal found the violation to have occurred as a result of what it called the 'roller-coaster' effect of the regulatory modifications. 184 In Toto v. Lebanon, the tribunal found no liability on the part of the respondent. It held that:
In the absence of a stabilisation clause or similar commitment, which were not granted in the present case, changes in the regulatory framework would be considered as breaches of the duty to grant full protection and fair and equitable treatment only in case of a drastic or discriminatory change in the essential features of the transaction. 185 And in Impregilo v. Argentina, the tribunal set out the following test:
The legitimate expectations of foreign investors cannot be that the State will never modify the legal framework, especially in times of crisis, but certainly investors must be protected from unreasonable modifications of that legal framework.
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As one can see by looking at all these pronouncements, there is no single answer to the question as to when a change of regulatory framework (absent a specific commitment) would entail a violation of the fair and equitable treatment.
The tests proposed by the tribunals vary, ranging from consideration of the extent of the change (El Paso), to the way change occurs (PSEG), up to the discriminatory effect (Toto and Parkerings) or the unreasonable nature (Impregilo) of such change. The impression one receives is that in some instances the legal test was dictated by the specific facts of the case (and possibly also the different industry sectors at stake). Perhaps a definition of the exact (and abstract) threshold that would be applicable in all types of situations is an impossible endeavour. Some may view this as regrettable for the ensuing lack of legal certainty, with stakeholders left in the unpredictability as to when a change in framework will cross the line and become a treaty breach. One may, however, envisage certain general safeguards that states should observe in order to avoid liability under a BIT when a significant change of the regulatory framework is susceptible to impact on foreign investors. For example, in order for the change not to be too abrupt, the host state should give those affected by the change adequate warning, and, where possible, adopt transitional measures.
187 It is to be expected that the presence of such safeguards will be taken into account by an arbitral tribunal when deciding whether a breach of fair and equitable treatment has occurred.
b. Expectations must take into account all circumstances, including the level of development of the host country
A second field where the tribunals' analysis has become more refined in the recent years has concerned the more precise content that investors' expectations assume (or should assume) vis-à-vis a certain regulatory framework, which is later modified. Tribunals have generally stressed that expectations need to be 'reasonable' in order to attract protection under the fair and equitable treatment standard. 188 But what are the factors that an arbitral tribunal should consider when assessing the degree of reasonableness of the expectations (and therefore their ultimate legitimacy)? Tribunals have observed that the investor's legitimate expectations have to be put into relation with the host state's specific characteristics in terms of investment environment. It would seem quite obvious that what an investor can legitimately expect (especially in terms of level of stability or transparency) cannot be the same in a highly developed country as it is in a developing or emerging economy. One treaty, the Investment Agreement for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Common Investment Area, introduces in its text an element of flexibility in the interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment standard precisely based on the level of development of the respondent country. 189 Even in the absence of such an express reference in the text of the treaty, arbitral tribunals have been ready to consider that the reasonableness requirement inherent in expectations allows for, or even mandates, an examination of all circumstances that the investor should have considered when making the investment, including the level of development of the host country. 190 In Duke v. Ecuador, the tribunal set out a holistic approach to the evaluation of expectations:
The assessment of the reasonableness or legitimacy [of the investor's expectations] must take into account all circumstances, including not only the facts surrounding the investment, but also the political, socioeconomic, cultural and historical conditions prevailing in the host State. 191 situation in Lebanon, with substantial economic challenges and colossal reconstruction efforts, did not justify legal expectations that custom duties would remain unchanged '. 195 In many circumstances, an investor may be attracted to invest in a developing country because the possibility of earning a rate of return on its capital may be higher than in developed economies. 196 Yet, the presumably greater instability will be indeed part of the business risk, and an inquiry into the reasonableness of its expectations should not fail to assess this element. 197 In Parkerings v. Lithuania, for example, the tribunal expressly noted that circumstances in a country in transition could not justify legitimate expectation as regards the stability of the investment environment. A prudent businessman would have sought to protect its legitimate expectations through a stabilization clause. 198 Finally, risk connected to a developing country's economic situation is not the only risk the investor must assess. In a developed economy, an investor must realistically assess regulatory risk. 199 Thus, in Methanex v. USA, the tribunal held that the investor could not have expected that California would refrain from regulatory changes. The investor had knowingly entered a framework in which there was close supervision from various interest groups and the concern for environmental issues was notoriously high. 200 Similarly, in Glamis Gold v. USA, the claim of frustration of legitimate expectations failed, partly because 'Claimant was operating in a climate that was becoming more and more sensitive to the environmental consequences of open-pit mining'. 
Assessing the 'reasonableness' of the expectation: the investor's conduct
It has been seen that consideration for socio-economic circumstances helps shaping the content of expectations. The reasonableness requirement inherent in expectations is in turn affected by a further component, which concerns the role played the investor in the investment operation. 202 This again means that expectations have to be analysed in concreto in order to determine whether the investor has acted with diligence and thus can be said to hold the expectations in the relevant circumstances. The investor's diligent conduct comes into play irrespective of the source that arouses the expectation, i.e., regardless of whether the expectation is rooted in a contractual commitment, in a unilateral representation, or in the regulatory framework. A few examples will illustrate the point.
In ADF v. USA, one of the first cases to make reference to the concept of legitimate expectations (although without in-depth explanation), 203 the tribunal discussed the investor's expectation allegedly created by existing case-law. It denied the existence of a legitimate expectation because the expectation was not created by 'any misleading representations made by authorized officials of the US federal government but rather…by legal advice received from private counsel'. 204 If the investor knows (or ought to have known, by acquiring proper legal advice) that it cannot attain a certain result or act, because that would contravene the host state's domestic law, a legitimate expectation cannot be said to have arisen. It is useful to return to the already seen MTD v. Chile case. The tribunal found that the Chilean government had created expectations by supporting the real estate project by, inter alia, entering into the investment contract. However, the laws in force did not permit the land the investor had acquired to be developed for commercial purposes. Further, the investment contract between the two parties made the approval in question subject to other necessary authorizations, and merely assented to the transfer of foreign capital flows to Chile. The finding of legitimate expectations is questionable in these circumstances. If the investor had performed a diligent inquiry into the regulatory framework, it could not have developed legitimate expectations at all in the first place, because its investigation would have evinced that his investment could not proceed as planned. 205 Yet, the tribunal decided that it was justified to protect the investor's expectations under the fair and equitable treatment standard, because the government had not been clear in dealing with the claimant. However, in a Solomonic decision, the tribunal reduced by 50 per cent the damages awarded based on the fact that the investor should have made an independent assessment. 206 In Metalpar v. Argentina, the tribunal observed that the investor had relevant business experience and knowledge that the automobile industry in Argentina was in bad conditions. This convinced the tribunal that it was 'unlikely that Claimants legitimately expected that their investments would not be subject to the ups and downs of the country in which they were made or that the crisis that could already be foreseen would not make it necessary to issue legal measures to cope with it'. 207 It thus found that no violation of the fair and equitable treatment had occurred.
It is quite evident that legitimate expectations are unworthy of protection if the representation, promise, or assurance was procured by fraud, or if the investor failed to disclosed relevant facts. The latter situation occurred in Thunderbird v. Mexico. Amongst the reasons that convinced the majority that the claimant could not have any legitimate expectations was that in its submission to a governmental authority the investor had not supplied adequate information and made a proper disclosure. 208 Similarly, in Chemtura v. Canada the tribunal found that 'the disingenuous position taken by the Claimant' could not 'justify a "reasonable" or "legitimate" expectation'.
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V. Concluding remarks
Legitimate expectations have penetrated investment treaty jurisprudence of the last decade in a pervasive way. This paper has first attempted to provide a description of the roots of the concept. It has looked at national administrative law systems, as well as at the EU framework, with a view to grasping the common features of protection of expectations under those systems. While differences between each system are inevitable, core similarities could be highlighted. This is particularly important if one attempts to inform the content of 'fair and equitable treatment' under investment treaties by way of reference to principles of law as embodied in the principal legal systems of the world.
In the investment treaty context, first generation awards display an almost complete lack of analysis as to the reasons for including protection of legitimate expectations as a sub-element, or indeed the 'dominant' sub-element, of fair and equitable treatment. Later and more recent awards, while building on the established line of earlier cases, are commendable for providing a fine-tuning of many of the issues involved in the doctrine of legitimate expectations. This paper has attempted to group the situations where expectations are typically invoked, by looking at the different conduct by the host state. Thus, when a contractual commitment is at stake, the expectation factor appears to be the strongest. Yet, it has also been seen that resort to this concept in this situation entails the risk of equating any kind of contractual expectation with a genuine treaty claim.
In a second type of situation, the concept of legitimate expectations is particularly useful to describe a situation where the host state has induced an investment by way of certain informal representations or promises, on which the investor has relied at the time of making the investment. If these are both specific and individualised, the doctrine of legitimate expectations will provide a valuable tool to hold the host state liable. This approach is in line with domestic law systems which typically extend protection to legitimate expectations in these kinds of situations. It would also be in line with public international law rules on unilateral acts, to the extent that those were to be considered applicable by analogy in investor-state relations.
Finally, the paper has addressed the situation where the claimant alleges that its expectations are tied to a stable regulatory framework. In those circumstances the use of legitimate expectations cannot be easily justified, unless strict limits are posed. Two areas have in particular seen a refinement in the tribunals' analysis. First, what an investor may expect has to be assessed according to the totality of circumstances, including the socio-economic situation and the development level of the host state. Second, the investor's own conduct plays a crucial role in evaluating whether the expectation was reasonable, and hence legitimate, in those set of circumstances. Meg Kinnear has rightly asked whether account for this variables (the investor's conduct, the reasonableness of the investor's expectations, or the level of the development of the host state) does not undermine one of the most basic premises underlying fair and equitable treatment, i.e., its absolute (non-relative) nature. 210 Yet, this seems almost an inevitable consequence of resorting to a concept, the 'expectation', that bears a certain level of subjectivity. 211 But at the same time the idea of legitimate expectations is an extremely flexible tool that allows arbitral tribunals to balance investors' interests and the host state's right to regulate, 212 in line with the more general balancing idea behind fair and equitable treatment. 213 Arbitral tribunals will no doubt continue to provide clearer guidance to such balancing exercise and to contribute
